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Caligula's Horse
Abstract
If I had not been, since boyhood, sceptical of all forms of address, by which I mean prose spoken in
public, I would not have been invited to address you this morning, since the honour you have paid me is
the very one I have been determined to avoid because I write verse. Public prose contains in it an
affability, in fact, a superiority that is political. It must contain charm, however contorted its syntax; it must
communicate, however high-pitched its subject; and most horrible of all to a poet (a word that makes me
nauseous when I apply it to myself), it must make sense. It is the very opposite of the perpetual ignorance
of poetry, the induced chaos from which a poem begins. I am perhaps perpetuating this chaos now,
because it is very difficult, almost impossible, not in my nature, to make sense. Because I do not know
what sense is, certainly because I know it is not common but rare, I have avoided writing critical or
philosophical prose for all of my life.
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DEREK WALCOTT

Caligula's Horse
opening address delivered at Eight Conference on West Indian Literature, Mona,
Jamaica, May 1988.
If I had not been, since boyhood, sceptical of all forms of address, by which
I mean prose spoken in public, I would not have been invited to address you
this morning, since the honour you have paid me is the very one I have been
determined to avoid because I write verse. Public prose contains in it an
affability, in fact, a superiority that is political. It must contain charm,
however contorted its syntax; it must communicate, however high-pitched
its subject; and most horrible of all to a poet (a word that makes me nauseous
when I apply it to myself), it must make sense. It is the very opposite of the
perpetual ignorance of poetry, the induced chaos from which a poem begins.
I am perhaps perpetuating this chaos now, because it is very difficult, almost
impossible, not in my nature, to make sense. Because I do not know what
sense is, certainly because I know it is not common but rare, I have avoided
writing critical or philosophical prose for all of my life.
Typing this last word I made an error. I wrote the word 'love' instead of
the word 'life', and have corrected it to mean what I intended. To mean what
I intended is what this public prose would have me believe, but to discover,
through a typographical error, what is accidental but also true is to leave in
the error and write 1 have avoided writing critical or philosophical prose
for all of my love'. That is one part of the poetic process, accident as
illumination, error as truth, typographical mistakes as revelation. Auden
once received proofs of a poem called 'Iceland', or about Iceland, in which
he had originally written 'and the poets have names for the sea' but which
came back from the printer as 'and the ports have names for the sea', so
Auden seized on the printer's error with a spasm of revelation equal in its
shock of delight to the laser beam that unhorsed Saul on the Damascus road,
and kept the typo. 'And the poets have names for the sea' is very good but
pompous, but 'the ports have names for the sea' is not only epical but
fantastically accurate. The provinciality and hermetic variations of the
separate, terrified or possessing faith of those small wharves for that eternal
force outside their ragged limits, the bays like mouths all pronouncing the
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word sea, naming it separately and self-assuredly, thanks to the astigmatism
of a printer, or thanks perhaps to Auden's calligraphy, made a line of verse
that makes another poet gasp with delight.
Besides I have always thought in two margins. It has been the rigid
benediction of my life, and to think in two margins - one on the right, and
one on the left, obviously - is to serve a life-long sentence. To live out a pun.
By a life-long sentence I mean both the sweet and chafing prison which the
soul chooses and which it calls (since apparently everything must have its
noun) poetry, but it is also to see poems as simply parentheses, asides of that
life-long sentence, as now a phrase of Dylan Thomas's springs to mind: 'that
poetry is statements made on the way to the grave'. So, you see what happens
when poets are asked to think with only one margin, that of the left, unless
they are Korean, or Hebrew, writing in the wrong direction, but still with
the sense of that other approaching margin, that versus at the end of which
the plough turns, those primary gardens always laid in squared ftirrows; but
to be a creature who always thinks of two margins, left and right as the poem
is being made, who believes as much in the right-hand margin as he or she
does in the left, is more than a pun about politics. The business of politics is
the business of discourse, and the language of discourse is prose, the
language of one margin only, and that one margin, in politics, may be called
right when it is left and left when it is right.
This is not only what conftjses those who listen to political addresses but
what reduces cities to rubble and incinerates generations who mistake the
margins. But also, this business of margins, of making sense, of saying what
one means, is the occupation of tyrants, of those who can make four-hour
tirades without interruption, without self-contradiction, without that
ignorance which the poet believes in, without a sense of horizon, and
certainly from the conviction that the tyrant-speaker must believe that he
owns both margins. If tyrants had to compose their tirade in verse, if critics
had to write criticism in regular metre, we would have less argument and
more accidental, even contradictory, essays. Pope said it in one couplet; but
the proper study of mankind, as he points out, is an inferior occupation
compared to the question of God.
Because this is an injunction to critics: that their subject is not literature
but God, or the gods, that poets should be judged by their approach towards
this subject, and the source of that subject is chaos, ignorance, and its emblem
is (how sweet Latin sounds in such contexts) Domintis iUummatio mea, Lord,
who art the light of my life. The moment when Auden, in a flash that is like
a seam in this chaos, like a light that comes from what he had no intention
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of writing, wrote the word 'ports' for the word 'poets' - that is what I would
be more happily engaged in this morning.
But there also comes a time when we pay for all we have tried to do by
being asked to practise, to honour, its opposite, when a poet who has earned
some respect from his colleagues is asked by critic-philosophers this
question: 'Yes, we know you can write poetry, but can you think?' And I
confess with a right-hand margin and left-hand margin combination of
arrogance and humility that I do not know how to think. Not to know what
to think is the bewilderment of the normal human predicament in a political
context. And so we are told what to think by popes, by parsons, by lecturers,
and apparently now by me. Because my position here is elective, political,
with frightening dangers, the most honest posture I could assume is that of
a shrug. For that shrug - whether it be the grunt of a furrowed-forehead
primate or of a hermit who has taken a vow of exterior silence - is what
angers systems, what infuriates the right-hand margin. The poet chooses his
prison so early that it makes the prison cell of the tyrant a repetition, it makes
the cell of the monk theatrical. Besides, the silence of the hermit is what
makes him loquacious, garrulous in his conversations with the silent
language of trees, seas, stars, crabs, his ancestors, stones and squirrels, and
God.
But now it has happened: the seduction of authority. Now I am like the
tyrant, the orderer, the one who says 'Listen, I will reveal, I shall guide, I
shall confirm expectation, I shall play by the rules.' The tyrant mounts the
platform and the hundreds of thousands in the public square are crying
'Convince me', the parson ascends the pulpit and the congregation is praying
'Convert me', the poet ascends to the lectern and the moment he is
bemedalled or laurelled like a competing athlete, or some betting pool of
literature's favourite horse, he becomes the pet of the crazy emperor, he
becomes a critic. He has sublimated himself.
How obvious this is, that a poet should sneer at critics. You see, even in
this, behaviour of a certain predictability is confirmed. Critics have their own
form of masochism, because once they have elected the tyrant to pronounce,
the parson to preach, the medalled and laurelled athlete or the crowned
horse of Caligula to say a few words into the microphone like Mr. Ed, they
are also saying with the penitential fury of their self-Inquisition 'Insult us,
tell us we are dirt, preserve that sublimity to which we have elevated you
once you remember that we, who supposedly speak sense on behalf of the
mob, can bring you down as fervently, remember we are the ones who make
sense, the ones who preferred that you think for us.'

140

This too is tiieatrical, and only part of the truth. The margin on the right
has dissolved like a horizon in a fog of its own making, a required
performance of a half-lie - because since boyhood I have delighted in
criticism. I cherished the essays of Eliot not because of his perceptions but
because of their quotations. They induced in me the truest humility: that is,
the desire to imitate, to imprison myself within those margins. Since then a
lot of dead fish have beached on the sand. Mostly the fish are French fish,
and off their pages there is the reek of the fishmonger's hands. I have a
horror not of that stink, but of the intellectual veneration of rot, because
from the far-off reek which I get from the stalls of the Academy, there is now
a school of fishermen as well as schools of fish, and these fishmongers are
interested in examining the disembowelled entrails of poetry, of marketing
its guts and its surrounding conversation of flies. When French poetry dies
the dead fish of French criticism is sold to the suckers. 'Moby Dick is nothing
but words, and what are words, and what do I mean when I say Moby Dick,
and if I say Moby Dick what exactly do I mean?' It convinces one that Onan
was a Frenchman, but no amount of masturbation can induce the Muse.
What do I mean by masturbation? Well, you take your hand and you write
firom the left-hand margin and stop when you have achieved some spasm of
self-recognition that may not breed but will appear to conceive, and that is
known as literary philosophy and without any danger of arrest by the
spiritual police, it is what I am demonstrating now.
I cannot think because I refuse to, unlike Descartes. I have always put
Descartes behind the horse, and the horse is Pegasus - not the hotel I am
staying in at the moment, but the other Pegasus, the one with the wings.
What I believe is: I don't know how to think therefore I am. I am one who
cannot accept these processes, of games of self-contradiction, of essays on
poetry, any more than I can accept the right-hand margin of History, which
begins, in our language, firom the left and proceeds without trim, without
metre, without that closing question of the couplet until it satisfies itself with
cause and effect. This ignorance is old. It is the future of the Caribbean.
Historians say now, it all depends on what you mean by History. To me
that is no dififerent firom saying it all depends on what you mean by prison,
what you mean by church, what you mean by a cobbled alley in Lisbon, an
abandoned barracoon at the back of a plantation which tourists photograph.
The real question is 'What do you mean by Time?' And it is here that
historians had better secure their wristwatches or sundials, because we have
to be careful of blasphemy, those of us whose religion is verse. The
imagination is a territory as subject to invasion and seizure as any far
province of Empire, so today when the sellers of dead fish claim whatever
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they claim (because honestly I never think of them), and when historians
are willing to join poets in defining history as one aspect of imagination that is, memory - it is then that poets have to be mauled and abused. Tyrants
are failed artists. They paint in secret, they compose verses in secret, but
they sculpt their own images publicly. The last thing they have, like
historians, is imagination. A historian dare not imagine, a poet dare not
think, certainly not in the way that he is expected to. That is Stalin murdering
Mandelstam. History is memory, but it is not creative memory.
And what is the difference between what the historian (and literary
criticism is a branch of history) remembers, and what the poet remembers?
Time. To the dictator time is a given period of which he is terrified - for him
there is no consolation in the fact that his bronze image will be at least bad
art or that the bard who sings his achievements can take permanent revenge
by writing badly about him. The superficial idea of art as immortal is not
what I mean: this is a prosaic idea of time, the immortality of art. To the
poet, there is no word for this dimension of memory, and the wonder of
poetry is that it does not mean time to be defined temporally any more than
God dare be defined by that sense of moving firom the left: margin to the
right to arrive at some proof
The young poet is a blessed being. If there is one now in this audience, I
invite him or her to sneer, to turn away fi-om these linear pronouncements
with that sacred contempt with which I refused, by the grace of God, to
believe, to prefer instead the grace that waits for the accidents of the
print-setter who changed poets to ports, to the earlier error I made when I
wrote either life for love of love for life, I have now forgotten which, and to
see, as something of a public figure but still I hope, a hermit, a hider, a
protector of silences, the vow I took as a boy not to listen. I have a fi-iend in
Saint Lucia who lives in a wonderfiil cove over the hill from a luxury
beach-hotel. He wrote poetry once, and he is also an important official in
Government, and in fun once I called him the only public hermit I know.
That is what, I am sure, in spite of the honour, you would have me remain.
Thank you.
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